From Conflict to Coalition: Profit-Sharing Institutions and the Political Economy of Trade (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)

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Description

International trade ceaselessly inspires intense conflict between workers and their employers. On this book, Adam Dean studies the conditions under which labor and capital collaborate in fortify of the similar trade policies. Dean argues that capital-labor agreement on trade policy relies on the presence of ‘profit-sharing institutions’. He tests this theory through case studies from the US, Britain, and Argentina in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries; they offer a revisionist history placing class conflict on the center of the political economy of trade. Analysis of data from a couple of hundred countries from 1986 to 2002 demonstrates that the field’s conventional wisdom systematically exaggerates the advantages that workers receive from trade policy reforms. From Conflict to Coalition boldly explains why labor is neither an automatic beneficiary nor an automatic ally of capital in terms of trade policy and distributional conflict.

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