Description
Between 1820 and 1990, the share of world source of revenue going to today’s wealthy nations soared from twenty percent to almost seventy. Since then, that share has plummeted to where it was once in 1900. As Richard Stanley Baldwin explains, this reversal of fortune reflects a new age of globalization that may be drastically different from the old.
In the 1800s, globalization leaped forward when steam power and international peace lowered the costs of moving goods across borders. This triggered a self-fueling cycle of industrial agglomeration and growth that propelled today’s rich nations to dominance. That was once the Great Divergence. The new globalization is driven by information technology, which has radically reduced the price of moving ideas across borders. This has made it practical for multinational firms to move labor-intensive work to developing nations. But to keep the whole manufacturing process in sync, the firms also shipped their marketing, managerial, and technical know-how in another country along side the offshored jobs. The new possibility of combining high tech with low wages propelled the rapid industrialization of a handful of developing nations, the simultaneous deindustrialization of developed nations, and a commodity supercycle that may be only now really fizzling out. The result is today’s Great Convergence.
Because globalization is now driven by fast-paced technological change and the fragmentation of production, its have an effect on is more sudden, more selective, more unpredictable, and more uncontrollable. As The Great Convergence shows, the new globalization presents rich and developing nations alike with unprecedented policy challenges in their efforts to handle reliable growth and social cohesion.